Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Self-identification, philosophy: here we are concerned with the conditions for the ability of a thinking subject to distinguish itself from other subjects or objects in order to relate to itself with language, gestures, and actions. See also private language, privileged access, identification, individuation, introspection, self, I, self-attribution._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jean-Paul Sartre on Self- Identification - Dictionary of Arguments
Frank I 572f Self-identification/Stout: is quite different from the way it is experienced by another subject - mind and body are inseparable. Sartre: (as Nagel): the problem stems only from the fact that I am not looking to connect with my body, but with the body of the other. The chemical description is not for me. ((s) I did not experience it.) So my body does not appear to me in the world. ((s) Not like a piece in the world). Evans per. >Self/Sartre, >Consciousness/Sartre, >Self-knowledge. Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Sart I J.-P. Sartre Being and Nothingness 1993 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Sartre
> Counter arguments in relation to Self- Identification
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27